



THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

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SOLDIER INTERVIEWS-SOMALIA

by U.S. Army Research Institute

Researchers from the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI), Alexandria, VA, and the University of Maryland, College Park, MD, recently conducted interviews and focus groups with Fort Drum, NY, returnees from Somalia to collect attitudes and opinions from their experiences. The focus group consisted of six soldiers per group. Informal discussions were also conducted with the division commander, other officers and the family support group leader. Following are some of the initial findings:

TRAINING: IS THERE AN OVERLAP / A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMBAT AND PEACEKEEPING TASKS?

Consensus of soldiers returning in Dec 94 -- Somalia was primarily a combat operation, although tasks performed included:

- ◆ Combat tasks.
- ◆ Noncombat tasks.
- ◆ Tasks that could be considered both combat or noncombat.

Soldiers did not consider this a peacekeeping mission:

- ◆ They did not perform some expected peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks.
- ◆ They did perform combat tasks.
- ◆ Tasks were performed under combat conditions.

Previously trained tasks required mission-specific refinements in country. For example:

- ◆ Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT).
- ◆ Cordon and search.
- ◆ Leadership tasks, such as
 - ✓ Coping with soldier boredom and operational monotony;
 - ✓ Working with a variety of players (clan elders, NGOs, UN);
 - ✓ Controlling rumors, dealing with impact of media, and
 - ✓ Dealing with soldier morale and concerns about "mission creep," return date, and fairness of badges/awards.

MINDSETS: COMBAT VS PEACEKEEPING. IS THERE A DIFFERENCE?

Yes, they are different mindsets. Factors that influence both mindsets:

- ◆ Unit preparation.
- ◆ Individual preference for combat/peacekeeping.
- ◆ Information on mission and conditions.
- ◆ Actual mission and conditions.
- ◆ Emotional reactions to the situation.
- ◆ Rules of Engagement (ROE).

Respondents were in a combat mindset in Somalia.

However, soldiers said behavior is determined more by discipline than by mindset.

- ◆ Soldiers' anger at the Somalis and their culture sometimes influenced behavior within the ROE.
- ◆ Some soldiers may not have the discipline to behave according to ROE.

FAMILY SUPPORT: ARE THERE DIFFERENT FAMILY SUPPORT ISSUES FOR PEACEKEEPING AND COMBAT MISSIONS?

Regardless of mission, family needs for support and stress reduction are influenced by:

- ◆ Level of perceived soldier risks.
- ◆ Mission uncertainty.
- ◆ Uncertainty about soldier conditions.

Family stressors during the deployment:

- ◆ National news media:
 - ✓ Highlighted danger.
 - ✓ Provided partial or inaccurate information.
 - ✓ Failed to recognize soldiers.
- ◆ Some soldiers magnified risks to spouses.
- ◆ Rumors abounded.
- ◆ Prank calls were made to spouses.
- ◆ Separation.
- ◆ Uncertainty about return date.
- ◆ Substantial time and personal resources required to lead the family support group (FSG).

Reactions to increased stress:

- ◆ Greater involvement with the FSG.
- ◆ Increased desire for information.
- ◆ Increased spousal pressure to leave the U. S. Army.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

Mission

- ◆ Perceived mission (combat) differed from the stated mission.
- ◆ Soldiers believed the personnel, equipment, and weapons did not match their actual mission.

Operations

Soldiers believed they needed:

- ◆ Support from armor and mechanized units and cross-training.
- ◆ Better intelligence.
- ◆ Better coordination and working relationships with UN forces.
- ◆ ROE that were more appropriate to the situation.

Soldiers said the following factors affected their morale:

- ◆ Lack of clear-cut overall mission and goals.
- ◆ Lack of precise return date.
- ◆ Boredom and periods of inactivity.
- ◆ Lack of standardized criteria for badges, awards.
- ◆ Rumors.
- ◆ Perceived inequities with others in the same compound.

MY OBSERVATIONS

It should be clear from this month's NEWS FROM THE FRONT that current operations (peacekeeping/enforcement) continue to characterize CALL's observation of U. S. Army operations and training.

As CALL collects and analyzes observations and lessons from wherever the "front" may be for the U. S. Army, we never lose sight of the truism that mission success is directly related to the quality of training. Whether at home station, during a CTC rotation, or as part of a combat simulation exercise, the quality of training preparation and execution will be a great determinate in the ultimate success of any mission.

The jury is still out about the best training and preparation strategy for a mission spectrum ranging from all-out war, through Major Regional Contingencies, to Humanitarian Assistance. Some say that well-trained combat soldiers can automatically execute OOTW-peculiar tasks. Others tell us that an OOTW- specific training requirement exists. The knowledge that collective and individual combat skills decay when not practiced further muddies the water. That means that units executing OOTW missions must concurrently maintain warfighting skills.

What CALL is trying to ferret out are lessons from the "front" that best answer these questions so we can quickly turn these answers around to benefit everyone.

If you've developed solid training strategies or techniques, call us! Through CALL, you can share your good ideas with the rest of the U. S. Army, and we can all get smarter.

COL Roger Spickelmier,
Dir, CALL

PSYOP AND CA CONTRIBUTIONS IN SOMALIA

by CPT Parker, Combat Mnvr Analyst

Good coordination of the psychological operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) efforts during civil military operations in Somalia produced several useful results. This type of coordination should be the standard for future operations.

When CA teams went into the community, they found many advantages to bringing Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) with them. Often the CA teams and the TPTs required the same information about the local community and were able to combine their efforts. The TPTs also assisted the CA teams with their capability to broadcast messages and instructions to large groups of people.

PSYOP and CA teams worked in many districts in Somalia to assist in establishing and legitimizing the district councils and police forces. PSYOP teams were able to assist in providing feedback about these organizations to the population. CA teams working closely with council chairpersons and police forces were often able to defuse situations, such as sniper problems, work force problems and population control problems - generally, before they became a serious problem for maneuver units.

PSYOP and CA teams working together in Operations Other Than War can be a significant force multiplier. Successful techniques applied in Somalia should be the model for these operations.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

by CPT Mark Williams, Combat Support Analyst

The Army's current missions in OOTW, in both Somalia and Macedonia, demonstrate the need for the Army to be aware of standardized means and procedures to capture costs and receive cost reimbursement from the UN or host governments.

END SURVEY

The key action at the start of operations with the UN is the conduct of the "end survey." The end survey is performed by the UN command after the arrival of a national force. The survey is the UN military staff identification of the equipment, supplies, and personnel that the member country has deployed in support of the mission. Based on that survey, the UN command can identify member nation capabilities and what items the UN is responsible to support or provide reimbursement for costs associated with operational use. The UN normally pays for equipment deployment and the costs to maintain equipment for operational use. The UN normally also pays for personnel rotations twice annually, usually on a six-month basis.

UN PROCEDURES

The end survey sets the stage for these reimbursements. In both Somalia and Macedonia, U.S. forces were unfamiliar with the requirement to conduct the end survey with the UN command. Unfamiliarity with UN procedures in both operations caused U.S. forces to have problems in capturing costs and receiving reimbursement from the UN with current management systems.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Another resource management or cost accounting key in doing operations with the UN is in the Terms of Reference (TOR) (used in Somalia and Macedonia). The TOR is the document developed by the State Department with the Department of Defense that explains national responsibilities for each nation involved in a UN operation. The TOR is the planning document that impacts force structure, sets the stage upon deployment for the end survey, and provides the mission for the force the U.S. will deploy for a UN operation. The TOR document also addresses resource management and cost reimbursement. Detailed planning at the conception stage of involvement in UN operations during the development of the TOR eases cost impacts on national forces, since planners have already agreed on those subjects with the UN.

There is a key point to remember for force planners working with the UN. If the U.S. force is not tasked in the TOR and a force is deployed, the UN will not provide resources or reimbursement to support that force.

LESSONS:

- ◆ Procedures for resource management and cost reimbursement need to be built into every U.S./UN operation (at both the planning headquarters and with U.S. forces operating in theater).
- ◆ Units need to be prepared to conduct an end survey upon deployment to a UN operation.
- ◆ A resource management office needs to be considered as part of every force deployed to a U.S./UN operation.
- ◆ Finance capability also must exist for U.S. forces to pay contractors and suppliers in theater with cash.
- ◆ Resource management personnel should be considered as part of the team to either staff or develop the TOR.
- ◆ Ensure all forces deployed use a operational fund site (Army Program Code (APC))/UIC upon notification for deployment.
- ◆ Consider training staff personnel assigned to UN operations on UN procedures.
- ◆ Consider researching UN training programs for an exportable package to U.S. forces.

IPB IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW)

by CPT Phillip R. Parker, Combat Maneuver Analyst

Command post training and leader professional development should increase emphasis on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) under conditions of OOTW.

EFFECTIVE IPB

The key to effective IPB during operations in Somalia was the timely and innovative integration of available sources of intelligence. HUMINT, aerial reconnaissance and photography provided the most available raw intelligence. The integration of these sources of intelligence into the IPB process was extremely valuable.

CI, CA, NGOs

The integration of Counterintelligence (CI) and Civil Affairs (CA) teams into the IPB process was also very valuable. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) were another valuable source of intelligence. However, when soliciting intelligence from the NGOs, care must be taken to ensure that the neutral status of NGOs is not compromised. These organizations must maintain a neutral status so that their organizations can operate within the environment.

TARGETING PROCESS

The targeting process provided a focus for the intelligence efforts. Since most direct-action operations involved a reaction to enemy activity, the process was very useful. The DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER functions of the targeting process in OOTW focus on determining the appropriate attack system to capture, destroy, degrade, or neutralize resources that the enemy can least afford to lose. Therefore, the process is ideally designed for OOTW at any level. IPB can be developed in a parallel effort with key products of the targeting process.

DECIDE

The DECIDE function of the process provides a clear picture of the priorities that apply to the tasking of target acquisition assets, some of which may not be routinely available at the brigade and battalion levels (e.g., Q36 Firefinder Radar, CI teams, CA teams, fixed-wing aerial reconnaissance, OH-58D surveillance helicopters, Low-Level Voice Intercept, etc.). The products of this process are the commander's targeting guidance, commander's PIR and IR, commander's approval of the High Payoff Target List (HPTL), target selection standards, and finally, target folders on each of the High Payoff Targets (HPTs).

DETECT

The DETECT function of the process is the accumulation and acquisition of intelligence from those assets that were assigned to detect targets or answer the commander's PIR and IR. This process provides the commander the necessary detail on the enemy so that he can publish the Commander's Attack Guidance Matrix. IPB in OOTW from page 5

DELIVER

The DELIVER function then focuses on the selection of the lethal and nonlethal attack systems and methodology and specifies the detailed attack characteristics.

TARGETING PRODUCTS

The products of the targeting process are the HPTL and the Commander's Attack Guidance Matrix. These products are provided to the staff and are the foundation for a battle drill that they must execute to deliver the nonlethal or lethal effects within the enemy's decision cycle, many times in the absence of any further command guidance. Difficult and complex decisions are made ahead of time for the battle captain, who must react to a given situation in the absence of any further guidance.

The process of conducting IPB is outlined in FM 34-130, ***INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD***, and is applicable to OOTW.

As a result of what we have seen in Somalia, units should increase emphasis on IPB under conditions of OOTW, with special attention to the benefits on the application of the Targeting Process in this environment.

JUNGLE OPERATIONS

by CPT Phillip R. Parker, Combat Maneuver Analyst

CALL has received excellent feedback on Jungle Operations from the Jungle Warfare Center (JWC). Much of what the Observer/Controllers are seeing echos what we also see at the JRTC.

Overall, units do very well at the JWC, and the mistakes made are not unique to the jungle. However, the jungle does offer some significant challenges. Below are just a few of the key observations. CALL will publish detailed lessons from jungle operations in a future CTC Bulletin.

- ◆ Successful jungle operations are characterized by patient aggression, and deliberate small unit battle drill execution.
- ◆ Leaders normally lose control after contact. Well rehearsed battle drills and SOPs contribute to success. You can fire and maneuver in the jungle; it does take a considerably longer time to develop the situation.
- ◆ If the enemy is operating in platoons, then friendly platoons and squads cannot win the decisive battle. The scheme of maneuver must synchronize the efforts of the force so that adequate combat power is brought to bear in the decisive battles.
- ◆ Limited line of sight may prevent visual contact between units or elements of the same unit. Deliberate execution of battle drills allows units to overcome the obvious command and control problems associated with limited visibility and restricted terrain.
- ◆ Indirect fire adjustment is difficult because of limited visibility. A white phosphorous (WP) first round followed by high explosive delay is the recommended method of observing the impact and also getting the best effects of the munitions in the jungle.
- ◆ Noise and light do not carry as far in the jungle as in other environments. Noise and light are closer than they appear.
- ◆ Movement is slow because of the vegetation and terrain. As a result, troops will tire more quickly. Troop-leading procedures must allow adequate time to accomplish planned movements.
- ◆ Resupply and evacuation of dead and wounded are greatly hindered. Depending on the severity of the terrain, one injured soldier can render a squad combat ineffective.
- ◆ Communications and communications equipment are severely degraded because of the drastic relief, thick vegetation, and, in some times of the year, torrential rains and humidity. Detailed communications plans with redundant assets and field expedient antennas are key to success. Command posts must be selected where communications can be maintained with all subordinate and higher headquarters.



FOCUSED ROTATION PROGRAM

by CPT Tom Jucks, Maneuver Analyst

The Focused Rotation Program is a research visit aligned with a standard CTC rotation that allows no more than 10 subject matter experts (SMEs) from one or more proponent schools or agencies to collect and assess data for a specific area of interest. (CALL is the proponent for this program.) It is conducted as a verification of previous extensive research. The data derived from a focused rotation visit is used to collect tactics, techniques, and procedures to improve Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and Soldiers (DOTMLS). The proponent school assigned lead responsibility for a focused rotation develops a collection plan that outlines key questions and tasks that impact on the overall assessment objective. The final products will be updates to the proponent development of the DOTMLS and provide immediate feedback to the Total Army through the CALL publications.

The Focused Rotation Program is often thought to be part of the Doctrinal Review and Doctrinal Proficiency programs. The primary focus of the programs is on the exchange of information between the schools and the Training Centers.

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